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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HARD-NOSED IDEALISM AND U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

DAVID SLOSS*
The history of U.S. foreign policy can be characterized as a pendulum
swinging between the extremes of moralistic idealism and amoral realpolitik.
The presidencies of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter typify the moralistic
pole, whereas the Nixon-Kissinger era exemplifies the realpolitik approach to
foreign policy. Against this background, Harold Koh’s prescription for a
twenty-first century human rights policy1 is best understood as a plea for
“hard-nosed idealism,”2 an approach that attempts to blend the best aspects of
both idealism and realism, while avoiding the pitfalls of a foreign policy that is
either amoral, or rigidly moralistic.3
Koh organizes his policy prescriptions around four guiding principles:
telling the truth, justice, inside-outside engagement and preventing future
human rights abuses. This Response suggests that Koh’s four principles have a
common theme: each attempts to craft a middle way between moralistic
idealism and amoral realpolitik. This Response generally endorses Koh’s
hard-nosed idealist approach, as embodied in his four principles. It also
highlights areas in which Koh’s application of those principles to specific cases
is problematic.
I. TELLING THE TRUTH
Professor Koh contends that the State Department’s annual country reports
on human rights practices4 should be used “to tell the truth about human rights

* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Kristin Kadleck for her exceptional research assistance.
1. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002).
2. The term is a variation of the “hard-nosed utopianism” advocated by Peter Berger. See
PETER L. BERGER, PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE: POLITICAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE xiv
(1974).
3. Koh’s recommended human rights policy can be viewed as an application to the human
rights arena of a more general foreign policy approach advocated by Stanley Hoffmann. See
STANLEY HOFFMANN, WORLD DISORDERS: TROUBLED PEACE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 5469 (1998) (advocating a synthesis of realism and idealism).
4. The State Department is required to publish an annual report on the human rights
practices of other countries. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(d), 2304(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). To
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conditions around the globe, however painful or unwelcome that truth might
be.”5 Prior to Koh’s tenure as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, although
the State Department generally refrained from publishing outright lies, the
country reports frequently contained half-truths about human rights abuses in
friendly countries.6 The realpolitik opponents of truth-telling apparently
believed it was necessary to understate the severity of human rights abuses in
friendly countries in order to avoid damaging our relationships with those
countries.
The realpolitik defense of half-truths is problematic for both moral and
pragmatic reasons. The President and Secretary of State have both a moral and
legal duty to tell Congress the truth about human rights conditions around the
world—even in friendly countries.7 From the standpoint of the Executive
Branch, failure to tell the truth simply invites Congress to enact new legislative
provisions to advance Congress’s human rights agenda, which provisions tend
to place unwanted constraints on the President’s flexibility to implement
Moreover, the realpolitik resistance to truth-telling
foreign policy.8
undermines U.S. credibility overseas, making it more difficult for the United
States to advance its human rights agenda internationally. Finally, anecdotal
evidence suggests that Koh’s truth-telling approach, which he actually
implemented during his time as Assistant Secretary,9 did not have any serious
adverse consequences for U.S. relations with friendly countries.10

view the COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 (released February 2001), see
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
5. Koh, supra note 1, at 306.
6. “In the earliest years of the Country Reports, the tendency to shield strategic allies . . .
from plain-spoken criticism was quite strong, even when the record of their violations was clear.”
Statement, Elisa Massimino, Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Washington Office
(Mar. 7, 2001), in State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Roadmap for
Budgeting of Democracy and Human Rights Programs of the State Department: Hearings and
Markup Before the Comm. on Int’l Relations House of Representatives and the Subcomm. on
Int’l. Operations and Human Rights, 107th Cong. 171, 202 (2001).
7. The statute requires a “full and complete report regarding . . . the status of internationally
recognized human rights . . . [in all] foreign countries which are members of the United
Nations . . . .” 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(1)(B) (1994).
8. See Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights
Practices, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 246, 249-56 (1982) (describing the evolution of increasingly
stringent legislative requirements that Congress enacted in response to the Executive Branch’s
resistance to implementing statutory requirements related to human rights).
9. See Koh, supra note 1, at 307 n.35 (noting that the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights discontinued its annual critique of the State Department human rights reports on the
grounds that the State Department reports were accurate).
10. For example, the 1999 country report on Turkey—the last report published during Koh’s
tenure as Assistant Secretary—was highly critical of ongoing human rights abuses in Turkey. See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, Turkey, in
1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (released Feb. 23, 2000), available at
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So much for realpolitik. It is equally important to note that Koh’s
prescription for truth-telling differs markedly from a strictly moralistic
approach. This is evident if one considers the statutory requirement to
terminate both security and development assistance to “the government of any
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights . . . .”11 A rigid moralist might fault
Professor Koh because the key terminology—”consistent pattern of gross
violations” —is noticeably absent from his exposition of the truth-telling
principle. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the human rights country reports
produced under Koh’s stewardship never identified a friendly government as a
country that engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations,” despite the
fact that there are friendly governments to which that label could easily be
applied.
The Clinton Administration’s refusal to label friendly countries as “gross
violators,” and Koh’s decision not to cast his truth-telling principle in terms of
the gross violation language, reflect a pragmatic political judgment that the
costs of name-calling outweigh the benefits. Consider Saudi Arabia, for
example. Saudi Arabia is a major recipient of U.S. security assistance.12 Saudi
Arabia also has one of the worst human rights records of any country in the
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/365.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002). Even so, Turkey
continues to cooperate with the United States on a variety of important national security and
foreign policy issues.
11. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1994) (prohibiting development assistance to such countries). See
also 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting security assistance to “a country the government
of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights . . . .”). There are other statutes, as well, that impose a variety of economic sanctions on
countries with poor human rights records. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 92-102 (2001).
12. Appendix E to the human rights country reports for the year 2000 provides details of
U.S. economic and security assistance to foreign countries. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2000, 2837-48 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/app/1183.htm (released Feb. 23, 2001). That appendix
shows that the FY2000 Foreign Operations Budget totaled about $16.5 million. See id. at 2848.
This figure, though, includes only what might be termed “foreign aid.” Saudi Arabia was not a
recipient of foreign aid in FY2000. See id. at 2842-43 (omitting Saudi Arabia from the list of
FY2000 actual obligations).
However, the statute defines the term “security assistance” to include “sales of defense
articles or services . . . .” 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (d)(2) (1994). The Report by the Department of State
Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act summarizes sales of defense articles and
services for FY2000. REPORT BY THE DEP’T OF STATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 655 OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT: DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000,
http://www.pmdtc.org/docs/rpt655_9_99.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2002). The report “details
approximately $25 billion in licenses authorizing the export of defense articles” and
approximately $30 billion in licenses authorizing the export of defense services. See id. at 2.
This includes more than $500 million in defense articles for Saudi Arabia and more than $700
million in defense services for Saudi Arabia. See id. at 82-83, 132.
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world.13 Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia arguably engages in a consistent
pattern of gross human rights violations, no President has ever made such a
finding. The reason is obvious: Saudi Arabia is an important ally in the United
States’ pursuit of key strategic interests. A Presidential finding that Saudi
Arabia engages in a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations could
trigger a termination of security assistance,14 which in turn would jeopardize
important U.S. regional and global interests.
From a pragmatic standpoint, one can maximize the benefits of truthtelling, while minimizing the costs, by publishing a report that tells the
unvarnished truth about Saudi Arabia’s abysmal human rights record, without
naming Saudi Arabia as a gross violator. This is Koh’s hard-nosed idealist
approach. It constitutes an appropriate middle way between moralistic namecalling and realpolitik half-truths.
II. JUSTICE
Whereas Koh’s first principle focuses on the State Department’s human
rights country reports, his second principle addresses issues that arise when
countries in transition from dictatorship to democracy must decide how to
handle past human rights violations. Various commentators have described the
dilemma posed by such “transitional justice” issues as a choice between
“punishment and pardon,”15 “vengeance and forgiveness,”16 or “truth versus
13. Freedom House publishes an annual report which ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 7 for
both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 being the best rating, and 7 the worst. In the most
recent Freedom House report, Saudi Arabia scored a 7 on both political rights and civil liberties—
the worst possible score. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2002: THE
DEMOCRACY GAP 14 (2002), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/
2002/essay2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). This puts Saudi Arabia in the same league with
Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, Iraq, Libya and North Korea, all of which are targets of U.S.
sanctions. See id.
14. The statutory scheme related to termination of security assistance is quite complex. The
statute provides an “escape clause,” which enables the President to continue certain types of
security assistance, notwithstanding a finding that a country has engaged in a consistent pattern of
gross violations, if the President “certifies in writing . . . that extraordinary circumstances exist
warranting provision of such assistance.” 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1994). Therefore, a
Presidential finding that Saudi Arabia engages in a consistent pattern of gross human rights
violations would not necessarily result in the termination of all security assistance for Saudi
Arabia. However, Congress has the power to override such a Presidential certification by
adopting a joint resolution to terminate or restrict security assistance. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304
(c)(4)(A) (1994).
15. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Role of Transitional Justice,
in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 272 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye
eds., 1999) (“For a decade now it seems we have been struggling with the so-called . . .
‘punishment-pardon’ dilemma.”).
16. See generally, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
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justice.”17 Koh’s second principle is that “we need to promote principles of
accountability for past human rights violations. . . . [without] ignoring the
reality that societies in which large-scale human rights abuses have occurred
also need to achieve internal reconciliation to make the transition to the next
phase of their political existence.”18 Koh’s second principle is eminently
sound. It constitutes a middle way between the moralistic view that all
violators must be punished,19 and the realpolitik view that amnesty for human
rights violators is a necessary element of the transition from dictatorship to
democracy. Unfortunately, Koh does little to illuminate that middle way. He
discusses a variety of different approaches that have been utilized in different
countries without critically evaluating the pros and cons of various
approaches.20
Detailed analysis of the complex issue of transitional justice is well beyond
the scope of this brief Response; however, this section suggests that the
problem is best conceptualized as an attempt to craft a middle way between
moralistic idealism and amoral realpolitik. Whereas the moralistic extreme
attempts to disguise a primitive thirst for vengeance in the cloak of justice,21
and the realistic extreme attempts to utilize official pardons (amnesty) to
promote social amnesia, the hard-nosed idealist middle way embraces a
concept of “restorative justice” whose aim is “not so much to punish as to
redress or restore a balance that has been knocked askew.”22 States can
promote restorative justice, I suggest, by utilizing a combination of: (1)
punishment of the worst offenders; (2) amnesty for lesser offenders who
acknowledge their crimes; and (3) full disclosure of the atrocities committed.
This section illustrates the hard-nosed idealist approach by comparing Chile’s
blanket amnesty, South Africa’s societal reconciliation model, and the
retributive justice model exemplified by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Chile’s transition from dictatorship to democracy began in October 1988,
when the Chilean people voted for an end to military dictatorship.23 Seventeen
months later, in March 1990, Patricio Aylwin was inaugurated as the first

17. See generally, e.g., TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000) [hereinafter TRUTH V. JUSTICE].
18. Koh, supra note 1, at 311.
19. See generally, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
20. See Koh, supra note 1, at 311-14.
21. More than a century ago, Nietzsche commented on people’s tendency to attempt “to
sanctify revenge under the name of justice.” See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 73-74 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967).
22. MINOW, supra note 17, at 81 (quoting a remark attributed to Archbishop Tutu).
23. See PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE
UNDER PINOCHET 296-311 (1991).
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democratic President of the post-Pinochet era.24 However, Decree Law No.
2191, enacted by the Pinochet government in 1978, granted a general amnesty
to all “those who had committed criminal actions while the state of siege was
in effect from September 11, 1973 to March 10, 1978, or had been accomplices
to, or covered up such actions.”25 The amnesty law remained in effect even
after the transition to democratic government. Thus, the Chilean approach
attempted to dispense with punishment altogether, granting a blanket amnesty
to all human rights violators, without requiring them to acknowledge their
crimes.
Like South Africa, Chile did establish a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in the context of its transition from dictatorship to democracy.26
The Chilean Commission published extensive documentation about the victims
of human rights abuses.27 However, in contrast to South Africa, the Chilean
Commission did not identify the perpetrators, nor did it require any public
acknowledgment of their crimes.28
The best defense of the Chilean model is a realpolitik defense: the blanket
amnesty was necessary to ensure a smooth transition from dictatorship to
democracy. However, the Chilean example illustrates both the moral and
practical flaws associated with the realpolitik approach.
From a moral standpoint, it is impossible to justify a blanket amnesty for
the horrible crimes committed—especially for the top-level officials who
orchestrated the violence. Such a blanket amnesty is patently inconsistent with
the ethic of retributive justice. It is also incompatible with the ethic of
restorative justice, because Chile’s decision not to require the perpetrators of
human rights abuses publicly to acknowledge their crimes substantially
impaired the value of its Truth and Reconciliation Commission in promoting
societal reconciliation.29
From a practical standpoint, Chile’s amnesty has not worked. More than
ten years after the transition to democratic rule, Chile’s courts are still clogged
with a variety of criminal and civil cases against the alleged perpetrators.30
Moreover, Chilean lawyers and victims have been remarkably active in
24. See id. at 311-20.
25. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
89 (Phillip E. Berryman trans., 1993).
26. See generally id.
27. See id. at 146-453, 505-620, 645-79.
28. See id. at 42-43 (explaining that the decree establishing the Commission “forbade it to
take a stand on the potential responsibility of individual persons”).
29. Martha Minow’s work highlights the importance of the relationship between full public
disclosure and societal reconciliation, or “healing.” See MINOW, supra note 17, at 57-83.
30. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
2000, at 2441 (Sep. 2001) (“At year’s end, over 200 cases concerning human rights violations had
been filed in the courts against Pinochet.”), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/
wha/736.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
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bringing claims against Pinochet and his cronies not only in Chile’s domestic
courts, but also in European courts,31 U.S. courts,32 and international human
rights tribunals.33 The ongoing litigation indicates that the surviving family
members of those murdered by Pinochet’s henchman do not accept the
legitimacy of the amnesty. Thus, the Chilean example suggests that, for
societies that have suffered through serious human rights violations under
dictatorial regimes, there can be no societal reconciliation unless those
responsible for the abuses have, at a minimum, publicly acknowledged their
crimes.
Whereas Chile illustrates the problems associated with a realpolitik
approach, Yugoslavia illustrates the problems associated with a moralistic
emphasis on the duty to prosecute human rights offenders. In response to the
horrible events that occurred in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s, the
United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 827, which established
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).34 The Tribunal has
a broad mandate to prosecute and punish “persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the
Security Council . . . .”35
Although the creators of the ICTY undoubtedly had good intentions, the
actual operation of the ICTY raises significant ethical and practical difficulties.
From an ethical standpoint, the most troubling feature of the ICTY is the
problem of selective prosecution.36 In a situation like Yugoslavia, where large
numbers of people committed unspeakable atrocities, there are not “enough
courtrooms, lawyers, witnesses, experts, or time for prosecuting all who
31. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1
A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998), vacated by Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 430 (1999);
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1
A.C. 147 (1999) (ultimately granting the former Chilean leader no immunity from any allegations
of torture occurring after section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 came into effect in the
United Kingdom).
32. See Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (civil
suit against former member of Chilean secret police (“DINA”) brought by surviving family
members of individual who was allegedly executed by DINA shortly after the coup in Chile in
1973). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I am serving as one of plaintiffs’ counsel in the
Cabello case.
33. See, e.g., Chanfreau Orayce v. Chile, Cases 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512,
OEA/ser. L/V/II.98, doc. 7 rev. (1998), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/
97ench3a41an.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
34. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
available at http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/827e.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
35. Id.
36. For a good general discussion of the problem of selective prosecution in international
criminal law, see MINOW, supra note 17, at 40-47.
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deserve it . . . .”37 Given insufficient resources, one option is for ICTY
prosecutors to focus on the “big fish,” leaving prosecution of “small fish” to
the national courts. A second option is for prosecutors randomly to select a
few “small fish” for show trials. Unfortunately, the ICTY has adopted the
latter approach. The majority of those indicted and prosecuted have been
“small fish.”38 Selection of a handful of low-level officials for show trials
undermines the moral authority of the ICTY.39 It would be far better to limit
the prosecutions to a small number of high-level officials who bear the primary
moral responsibility for orchestrating the ethnic cleansing campaign.40
From a practical standpoint, there are two major difficulties with the
ICTY’s approach. First, prosecution is a poor tool for advancing the goals of
restorative justice and societal reconciliation41 —goals that are, or should be,
as important for the former Yugoslavia as the goal of retributive justice.
Restorative justice is best realized by an approach that encourages perpetrators
to acknowledge their guilt in the presence of victims, thereby inviting victims
to forgive the perpetrators.42 In contrast, the ICTY’s prosecutorial approach
creates incentives for defendants to deny their guilt, thereby inhibiting
opportunities for societal reconciliation.43
Second, the ICTY’s prosecutorial approach is far too time-consuming to
make a useful contribution to societal reconciliation in the near term. Since its

37. Id. at 45.
38. For a list of individuals indicted and tried by the ICTY, see Fact Sheet on ICTY
Proceedings, available at http:// www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (last modified Jan. 4,
2002).
39. There do not appear to be any published criteria for determining which low-level
officials are actually prosecuted and which ones escape criminal liability. However, the decision
is driven, at least in part, by the fortuitous circumstance that the ICTY is able to obtain
jurisdiction over the unlucky few who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
40. Carla del Ponte, the chief prosecutor for the ICTY, has apparently made a similar
suggestion. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 330 n.391 (2001) (quoting Carla del Ponte, chief
prosecutor for the ICTY). The arrest of Slobodan Milosevic, who is currently in the ICTY’s
custody, represents a significant positive step in this respect. Unfortunately, arrest warrants are
still outstanding for Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Moreover, as noted above, the
majority of those indicted and tried have been small fish. See supra text accompanying note 39.
41. See MINOW, supra note 17, at 57-61.
42. See Lorna McGregor, Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural Optimum or
Political Facade?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 32, 36-38 (2001). Of course, even in cases where a
perpetrator does acknowledge his guilt in the presence of a victim, there is no guarantee that the
victim will forgive the perpetrator. But this type of process facilitates genuine forgiveness, which
in turn helps promote societal reconciliation. See MINOW, supra note 17, at 18-20, 76-78.
43. Cf. Ronald C. Slye, Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South African
Amnesty Process, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 170, 173 (noting that, in a criminal trial,
the “accused are placed in a defensive position,” and “[t]heir goal is to escape liability”).
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inception, the ICTY has tried only twenty-three defendants.44 A report by the
Tribunal’s President estimates that the trial chambers will not complete their
work until 2016.45 As one commentator has noted, it is likely that the victims
“will perceive justice delivered in 2003, 2007, or 2016 as being ‘too little, too
late.’”46 It is difficult to justify spending billions of dollars47 for a process that
is projected to take another fifteen years to complete, especially because there
is little or no evidence that this process is actually contributing to societal
reconciliation.
If Chile illustrates the problems of a realpolitik approach, and the ICTY
illustrates the problems of a moralistic approach, then South Africa illustrates
the middle way between excessively moralistic prosecutory zeal and the
realpolitik defense of amnesties. In 1993, South Africa adopted an Interim
Constitution, which was designed to provide “a historic bridge between the
past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold
suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human
rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence . . . .”48 The Interim Constitution
attempted to address past human rights violations on the basis that “there is a
need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for
retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization . . . .”49 Shortly after
adoption of the Interim Constitution, Parliament enacted the so-called Truth
and Reconciliation Act.50 The Act established a Committee on Amnesty, in
order to “facilitat[e] the granting of amnesty to persons who make full

44. See Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, supra note 39.
45. Claude Jorda, Report on the Operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (May 12, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/
RAP000620e.htm.
46. Ivkovic, supra note 41, at 329.
47. To date, the Tribunal has spent over $470 million. See ICTY Key Figures, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002). If the ICTY continues for
another fifteen years at its current rate of spending roughly $100 million per year, it will have
spent a total of about $2 billion by 2016. See id.
48. Preamble, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, 1 JSRSA 2405 (1996) [hereinafter National Unity and Reconciliation Act]. For the full text of the Interim
Constitution, see S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) (date of commencement April 27, 1994), 5
JSRSA 1-266, available at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1993/constit0.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2002).
49. Preamble, National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 49. There is no precise
translation for the term “ubuntu,” but the term suggests that “my humanity is caught up in your
humanity because we say a person is a person through other persons . . . [and] forgiveness is an
absolute necessity for continued human existence.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Without
Forgiveness There is No Future, Foreword to EXPLORING FORGIVENESS xiii (Robert D. Enright
& Joanna North eds., 1998), quoted in McGregor, supra note 43, at 38.
50. National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 49, § 2(1) at 2-406.
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disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political
objective” and comply with certain other requirements of the Act.51
The South African model represents a bargain between perpetrators and
victims: “You publicly acknowledge your responsibility for human rights
violations, and you will not be criminally or civilly liable for your actions.”
This “amnesty for testimony” swap is preferable to the Chilean model because,
inasmuch as full disclosure is a pre-condition for amnesty, those who receive
amnesty are held accountable for their actions.52 Consistent with the statute,
the Amnesty Committee denied amnesty to applicants who provided
incomplete disclosures.53 Moreover, in its final report, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission recommended criminal prosecution of those who
did not receive amnesty.54 In fact, some of the worst offenders have been
prosecuted, albeit with mixed results.55
The South African approach is also superior to the ICTY approach,
because the ICTY has failed to establish any principled basis for distinguishing
between perpetrators who are prosecuted and those who escape criminal
prosecution.56 In contrast, the South African approach does provide a
principled basis for drawing such a distinction, because those who satisfied the
statutory criteria received amnesty, and the government reserved the right to
prosecute the others. Of course, South Africa is subject to criticism on the
grounds that many perpetrators who did not receive amnesty, including some
of the worst offenders, have not actually been prosecuted.57

51. Id. § 3(1)(b), at 2-406.
52. See generally, Slye, supra note 44, at 179-82 (noting that South African model provides
a form of accountability without punishment).
53. As of June 30, 1998, the Amnesty Committee had granted only 122 out of 4443 amnesty
applications. 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 276
(Susan de Villiers ed., 1999). The Committee had denied 138 applications on the grounds of
incomplete disclosure. See id. It denied an additional 369 applications on the grounds that the
applicant denied his or her guilt. See id. The killers of Steve Biko, in particular, were denied
amnesty, because they “continued to insist that Biko’s death was an accident for which they could
not be held responsible.” Slye, supra note 44, at 187 n.34.
54. Ronald C. Slye, International Law, Human Rights Beneficiaries, and South Africa: Some
Thoughts on the Utility of International Human Rights Law, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 64 (2001).
55. See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 299-300 (1998). The former Minister of Defence,
Magnus Malan, was acquitted on murder charges. See id. Major Eugene de Kock was found
guilty of six counts of murder and thirty other charges and sentenced to 212 years imprisonment.
See id. However, he was apparently granted amnesty a few years later. See William W. BurkeWhite, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of
Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 467, 495 n.125 (2001).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
57. See Where Have All the Bastards Gone?, WKLY. MAIL & GUARDIAN, June 15, 2000,
available at http://www.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/000615/NEWS17.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2002).
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Despite its shortcomings, though, South Africa’s restorative justice model
is preferable to the ICTY’s retributive justice model because: (1) the creators
of South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process recognized that it was
unrealistic to attempt to prosecute every perpetrator; and (2) they established a
principled basis for determining which perpetrators had earned the right to
receive amnesty.
It is still too early to formulate a definitive conclusion concerning the
extent to which South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has
advanced the goals of societal reconciliation and restorative justice.58
However, few would dispute the proposition that South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, and its associated Amnesty Committee, have
made a positive contribution to societal reconciliation in South Africa. In
contrast, Chile’s amnesty law probably had the effect of hindering, rather than
promoting, societal reconciliation in Chile. What little progress Yugoslavia
has made toward societal reconciliation is primarily attributable to changes in
political leadership, which occurred in spite of, not because of, the ICTY.59
Thus, although it is premature to render a final verdict on the South African
experiment, there is little doubt that South Africa’s approach is a better vehicle
for achieving societal reconciliation than either the Chilean or Yugoslav
model.
In sum, the South African model is not perfect, and the complex problems
of transitional justice cannot be reduced to a simple formula. As Professor
Koh notes, “no one solution fits all situations.”60 But South Africa’s
transitional justice mechanism provides a useful model because it strikes a
good balance between the legitimate idealistic desire to punish human rights
violators for their crimes, and the equally legitimate realistic desire to leave the
past behind, so that society can move forward into a better future.
III. INSIDE-OUTSIDE ENGAGEMENT
Koh’s third principle is that the United States should try to minimize
ongoing human rights abuses in other countries by persuading “each country
over time to accept the human rights norms of the international community as
internal norms, using . . . ‘inside’ diplomatic channels for government-togovernment dialogue against a background of ‘outside’ sanctions.”61 As a
general statement of principle, this approach is eminently sound. In keeping
with his hard-nosed idealist approach, Koh’s third principle attempts to craft a

58. For a tentative assessment, see Slye, supra note 44, at 177-82.
59. Slobodan Milosevic’s stubborn, and ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to retain his
position of political leadership in Serbia was undoubtedly influenced, to some extent, by fear that
his ouster would lead to prosecution by the ICTY, as indeed it has.
60. Koh, supra note 1, at 311.
61. Id. at 316.
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middle way between realism (which emphasizes “inside” dialogue) and
idealism (which emphasizes “outside” sanctions).
Here, the extreme
realpolitik position is that human rights abuses in other countries are not a
proper concern of U.S. foreign policy.62 The extreme moralist position is that
the United States should disassociate itself from objectionable governments by
severing ties, to the greatest extent possible, so that we are not “tainted” with
the sins of those governments.63 Koh’s recommended middle way “combines
techniques of internal persuasion with techniques of external pressure,” or
sanctions.64
When Koh’s analysis moves from a description of his third principle to the
application of that principle, he focuses on China as an example. With all due
respect to Professor Koh, I suggest that U.S. policy towards China does not
represent a middle way between realism and idealism. To the contrary, our
China policy exemplifies the flaws of a realpolitik foreign policy because U.S.
policy is characterized by almost exclusive reliance on “inside” dialogue,
without any significant “outside” sanctions designed to pressure China into
changing its behavior.65
Koh identifies five “outside” techniques that the United States has utilized
to pressure China into improving its human rights record:
publicly
condemning illegal arrests, publishing human rights reports that chronicle
Chinese abuses, pressing China to ratify human rights treaties, sponsoring
annual resolutions at the U.N. Human Rights Commission and designating
China for sanctions under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).66
The first three of these so-called “outside” techniques closely resemble
“inside” techniques, because they involve mere words, without any threat of
sanctions.67 The fourth technique—U.S. sponsorship of annual resolutions at
the U.N. Human Rights Commission—does involve at least an implied threat

62. See, e.g., Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 93d Cong. 117 (1973) (“I do believe that it is dangerous for us to make the
domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of American foreign policy
. . . .”).
63. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1994) (directing the President to “formulate and
conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which
will . . . avoid identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments
which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms . . .
.”).
64. Koh, supra note 1, at 317.
65. Koh admits that “this engagement strategy with China has thus far reaped only limited
human rights improvements.” Id. at 318. But he nevertheless defends the strategy as “the only
reasonable long-term approach . . . .” Id. In contrast, I suggest that the United States’ China
policy is flawed because it is inconsistent with Koh’s stated principle.
66. Id. at 317-18.
67. Of course, public condemnation is stronger medicine than private condemnation, but it
distorts the meaning of the term “sanctions” to say that public condemnation is a “sanction.”
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of sanctions. Unfortunately, though, China has successfully thwarted every
U.S. effort to persuade the Commission to pass a resolution condemning
Chinese human rights abuses.68 The United States has imposed sanctions on
China under the IRFA,69 but that is the only “outside” technique mentioned by
Koh that actually involves sanctions.
Moreover, the sanctions that the United States has actually imposed under
IRFA are the mildest sanctions permitted under the statute. To clarify this
point, some explanation of the statute is necessary. IRFA requires the
President annually to “review the status of religious freedom in each foreign
country” and to designate specific countries that are “of particular concern for
religious freedom.”70 The United States has twice designated China as a
country “of particular concern for religious freedom.”71 Once the President
has made that designation, the statute directs him either to impose one or more
of the various sanctions identified in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section
6445(a),72 or to undertake “commensurate action.”73 The sanctions in
paragraphs (9) through (15) include, inter alia: suspending development
assistance; terminating security assistance; instructing U.S. directors of
international financial institutions to vote against loans; and/or prohibiting U.S.
financial institutions from making loans or providing credits worth more than
ten million dollars in any twelve-month period.74 Additionally, the statute
provides that the President may order “the heads of the appropriate United

68. See Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Sixth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 219 (2001) (“China again mobilized support from developing countries to
block consideration of a U.S.-sponsored text that accused Beijing of suppressing religious
freedom and crushing dissent. . . . [I]t marked China’s ninth escape from censure since the
assault on unarmed protesters at Tienanmen Square in 1989.”)
69. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
70. 22 U.S.C. § 6442(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
71. See Designation of Countries of Particular Concern Under the International Religious
Freedom Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (May 1, 2001); Designation of Countries of Particular
Concern Under the International Religious Freedom Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,821 (Nov. 3, 1999).
This puts China in a group with Burma, Iran, Iraq and Sudan—the only other countries to be so
designated.
72. See § 6442(c)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999) (directing the President to choose from among the
various sanctions listed in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 6445(a)).
73. See id. §§ 6442(c)(1)(B), 6445(b) (Supp. V 1999). The statute does provide various
“escape clauses” that authorize the President to refrain from imposing sanctions in certain cases.
See § 6442(c)(2) (authorizing President to conclude a binding agreement with the foreign
government in lieu of imposing sanctions); § 6442(c)(4) (exception for countries where the
President previously imposed sanctions pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act); §
6442(c)(5) (exception for countries that are “already subject to multiple, broad-based sanctions
imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses”); § 6447(a) (authorizing President
to waive sanctions in some cases).
74. § 6445(a)(13).
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States agencies not to issue any (or a specified number of) specific licenses . . .
to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign government” under
the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act or the Atomic
Energy Act.75
The option apparently selected by President Clinton was to restrict
“exports of crime control and detection instruments and equipment[,]”76 which
are regulated under the Export Administration Act.77 Thus, despite significant
concerns about religious freedom in China, the Clinton Administration chose
not to restrict exports under the Arms Export Control Act or the Atomic
Energy Act. Nor did it restrict development assistance, security assistance or
loans from either U.S. or international financial institutions. Moreover,
inasmuch as the Clinton Administration chose to restrict only exports of crime
control and detection instruments and equipment, the IRFA sanctions have no
impact on the vast majority of equipment and materials regulated under the
Export Administration Act.78 Finally, a close analysis of the Export
Administration Regulations shows that there has been no change whatsoever to
the “crime control” portion of those regulations as a result of the sanctions
imposed on China under the IRFA.79

75. Id.
76. See State Dep’t Annual Report on Int’l Religious Freedom for 2000: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (testimony of Firuz
Kazemzadeh) [hereinafter Kazemzadeh testimony]. Mr. Kazemzadeh testified in his capacity as
vice chairman of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, an advisory
commission created by the International Religious Freedom Act, and composed mainly of U.S.
citizens “who are not being paid as officers or employees of the United States . . . .” § 6431(b)
(Supp. V 1999). During his testimony, Mr. Kazemzadeh criticized the Clinton Administration for
failing to publicize the sanctions imposed under IRFA. He noted, though, that the United States
“restricts exports of crime control and detection instruments and equipment” to China. His
statement appears to be the only public record of the specific sanctions imposed on China under
the IRFA.
77. 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 2401 et seq. (1994). See also 15 C.F.R. §742.7 (2001).
78. The complete list of equipment, materials and technology subject to controls under the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) is at 15 C.F.R. § 774.2 (2001), which fills almost 175
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. Crime control and detection instruments and
equipment comprise only twenty-one categories of the hundreds of categories of equipment and
materials that are controlled under the EAR. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.7(a)(1) (2001).
79. Under the regulations, an export license is required for exports of certain categories of
equipment to countries designated in CC column 1 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
See id. For equipment in the subject categories, the decision whether to grant a license for a
particular export to a listed country is discretionary. China was already listed in CC column 1 in
the 1999 version of the EAR, see 15 C.F.R. § 738, Supp. 1 (1999), before it was identified in
October 1999 as a country “of particular concern for religious freedom.” See Designation of
Countries of Particular Concern Under the International Religious Freedom Act, 64 Fed. Reg. at
59,821. China is still listed in CC column 1 in the 2001 version of the EAR. See 15 C.F.R. §
738.4 (2001). That has not changed.
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Thus, in the final analysis, the “sanction” amounts to a decision that, in
conducting its case-by-case discretionary review of license applications for
exports of crime control equipment to China, the Executive Branch may
choose to “distance the United States from [human rights] abuses”80 in China
by denying certain export license applications that might otherwise have been
approved. As others have noted, “[i]t is difficult to believe that this sanction
sends a strong message to Beijing on religious freedom.”81
Defenders of the Clinton Administration’s China policy may contend that
the act of labeling China as a country “of particular concern for religious
freedom,” by itself, puts substantial pressure on China to change its behavior.
Indeed, one could make a persuasive case that the public identification of
China as a violator of religious liberty is a harsher penalty than the restriction
on export of crime control equipment. But that is precisely the problem. With
respect to intellectual property rights, for example, the United States “has
threatened to impose billions of dollars in sanctions to vindicate U.S.
intellectual property interests.”82 In response to such threats, “the Chinese
government changed its behavior.”83 The juxtaposition of U.S. human rights
policy with U.S. intellectual property policy sends a clear message to China:
we are serious about protecting the intellectual property interests of U.S.
companies that do business in China, but when it comes to human rights and
religious freedom for the Chinese people, the U.S. policy is all talk and no
action.
Other aspects of U.S. policy toward China reinforce the impression that
human rights is a relatively low priority for U.S. foreign policy. While
criticizing Chinese human rights abuses, the United States has simultaneously
supported a broad range of political and economic benefits for China. On
October 10, 2000, President Clinton signed into law an Act to extend

With respect to a particular category of shotguns, the regulations distinguish between
countries for which an export license is required “regardless of end-user,” and countries for which
an export license is required “only if for sale or resale to police or law enforcement entities . . . .”
See 15 C.F.R. § 742.7(a)(2), (a)(3) (2001). Both before and after the imposition of sanctions,
China has been included in the category for which a license is required “only if for sale or resale
to police or law enforcement entities . . . .” Compare 15 C.F.R. § 738.4 (1999) to 15 C.F.R. §
738.4 (2001). Again, nothing has changed.
80. 15 C.F.R. § 742.7(b) (2001) (“The judicious use of export controls is intended to deter
the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, distance the United States from
such abuses and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country or region.”)
81. Kazemzadeh testimony, supra note 76.
82. China, the WTO, and the Human Rights: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights, 106th Cong. 4 (1999) (statement of Congressman
Christopher H. Smith).
83. Id.
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permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China.84 With full U.S. support,
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has recently concluded negotiations
with China on China’s terms of membership in the WTO.85 The United States
also decided not to oppose China’s bid to host the 2008 summer Olympics in
Beijing.86 China will reap tremendous economic and political benefits from
PNTR, WTO membership and the summer Olympics. By supporting these
types of benefits for China, without obtaining any concrete improvements in
China’s human rights record, the United States has sacrificed its human rights
principles on the altar of political and economic expediency.
In sum, Koh’s principle of inside-outside engagement constitutes an
appropriate middle way between realism and idealism. The failure of the U.S.
China policy should not be viewed as an indictment of Koh’s principle.
Rather, this policy has failed because it, contrary to Koh’s principle, has relied
almost exclusively on “inside” dialogue, without any significant threat of
“outside” sanctions.
IV. PREVENTING FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Koh’s final principle is that “the broadest challenge the United States faces
is not simply to redress past abuses, or to minimize current ones, but to
develop a consistent strategy to prevent future human rights abuse, by
promoting early warning, preventive diplomacy and long-term promotion of
democracy worldwide in all of its dimensions.”87 Koh’s discussion of
democracy promotion, in particular, is the most impressive part of his paper.
This is not because the idea of promoting democracy is a new idea (which it is
not), but rather because Koh convincingly demonstrates that “the Clinton
Administration made democracy promotion a core priority” of U.S. foreign
policy.88 When it comes to democracy promotion, other Presidents have
“talked the talk,” but the Clinton Administration’s multi-dimensional program
for building democracy, as described in detail by Professor Koh,89 shows that
President Clinton actually “walked the walk.”

84. See United States-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat. 880
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.); William J. Clinton, Remarks on
Signing Legislation on Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 2417 (Oct. 16, 2000). For analysis of the Act, see Leo Wise, Trading with China, 38 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 567 (2001).
85. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes
Negotiations on China’s Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
86. Amy Shipley, Beijing is Awarded Summer Olympics; Despite Protests, IOC Selects
China for 2008 Games, WASH. POST, July 14, 2001, at A1.
87. Koh, supra note 1, at 322.
88. Id. at 324.
89. Id. at 324-29.
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In accordance with his hard-nosed idealist approach, Koh’s program for
democracy promotion can also be viewed as a middle way between realism
and idealism. Advocates of a realpolitik approach contend that the United
States should not attempt to promote democracy in countries where the
introduction of democracy would have a destabilizing effect.90 This position is
morally unsatisfactory because it is inconsistent with the deep-rooted
American commitment to democratic values. Moreover, in the final analysis,
the realpolitik approach is unrealistic because it fails to recognize that nondemocratic governments are inherently unstable inasmuch as they fail to serve
the interests of their own citizens.91 For example, U.S. efforts to prop up the
Shah of Iran in the 1960’s and 1970’s were doomed to fail because the Shah
did not serve the interests of Iran’s people. By aligning itself with the Shah
under the realpolitik banner of “preserving stability,” the United States helped
produce the anti-American backlash whose effects reverberate today. In
contrast, a hard-nosed idealist policy would have attempted to pressure the
Shah into adopting democratic reforms which, if carried out successfully, may
have helped to avert the theocratic revolution. Even if that revolution was
inevitable, a prior policy that disassociated the United States from the human
rights abuses of the Shah’s regime would have helped to minimize the antiAmerican tendencies of the successor regime.
In contrast to realists, moralistic idealists do accept democracy promotion
as a legitimate goal of U.S. foreign policy. However, moralistic idealists tend
to be more concerned with the moral message implicit in a particular policy
than with the practical effects of that policy. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,92 popularly known as the
Helms-Burton Act, provides an excellent example. In addition to codifying
pre-existing sanctions against Cuba, the Act imposed draconian sanctions
against foreign companies that do business with Cuba.93 Although a stated
purpose of the Act was to promote freedom and democracy in Cuba,94 there is
no evidence that the Act produced any such result. However, the Act did spark
“formal protests from the international community, which condemned the Act
90. See, e.g., GEORGE F. KENNAN, AT A CENTURY’S ENDING: REFLECTIONS, 1982-1995, at
273-74 (1996).
91. This statement presupposes a concept of democracy that is focused on “government for
the people,” rather than elections, as the touchstone of democratic governance. Under this
definition of democracy, it is a tautology to say that a non-democratic government does not serve
the interests of its citizens.
92. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
93. The Act authorizes U.S. nationals to bring civil suits against persons who “traffic” in
property expropriated by the Cuban government. Id. § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 815. “Trafficking”
includes “engag[ing] in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property . . . .” Id. § 4(13), 110 Stat. at 790-91.
94. Id. § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89.
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as violating both customary international jurisdictional rules and the GATT.”95
If the actual objective of the Act was to send a message of moral condemnation
that would be heard around the world, without having any practical impact on
democracy in Cuba, the Act’s sponsors could not have chosen a better vehicle
for accomplishing that objective.96
Professor Koh’s discussion of the Clinton Administration’s multidimensional program for building democracy represents hard-nosed idealism at
its best. In contrast to the realpolitik approach, Koh’s hard-nosed idealist
approach is consistent with the deep-rooted American commitment to
democratic values. In contrast to the moralistic idealists, Koh’s approach
exhibits a concern for practical results, rather than empty posturing. In sum,
Professor Koh’s hard-nosed idealism constitutes a laudable third-way that
avoids the extremes of moralistic idealism and amoral realpolitik.

95. Cleveland, supra note 11, at 60.
96. I am not suggesting that the Act’s sponsors sought purposefully to design a statute that
would not promote democracy in Cuba. I am suggesting, though, that they were less concerned
with achieving practical results than they were with broadcasting a message of moral
condemnation.

